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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
LUNAR MODULE STRUCTURAL SUBSYSTEM 
B y  Stan ley  P. Weiss 
M a n n e d  Spacecraft Center  
SUMMARY 
The lunar module spacecraft was designed to operate exclusively in  a space envi- 
ronment. A ratio of approximately 1 to 15  of the structural weight to the fully loaded 
spacecraft weight was achieved. The spacecraft consists of a descent stage and an as- 
cent stage. A clear separation of the stages was accomplished for lunar launch o r  
abort. 
The design certification consisted of both component- and vehicle-level tests. 
Structural problems such as fatigue, stress corrosion, and nonidentical interchangeable 
par t s  required changes in the design and manufacture of the lunar module. 
No problems were associated with the primary lunar module structure during the 
1 0  Apollo missions, including four lunar landings. The structural  anomalies encoun- 
tered were associated with the secondary structure. 
INTRODUCTION 
The lunar module (LM), the first manned spacecraft designed to operate exclu- 
sively in  a space environment, was required to accomplish the lunar-landing phase of 
the Apollo Program. The structural subsystem, design requirements, configuration 
description, design and manufacturing problems, and design verification of the LM a r e  
discussed in  this paper. 
The LM was designed with emphasis on a minimum-weight structure. A typical 
a r e a  in  which considerable weight saving w a s  accomplished was in the reduction of 
structural  joints. This reduction was accomplished by machining large structural 
members  instead of machining a number of smaller members and joining them by fas- 
teners. During the design and manufacturing phases, two weight- reduction programs 
were implemented to remove excess weight from structural members. This weight re- 
moval resulted in  a ratio of approximately 1 to 15  of the structural  weight to the fully 
loaded spacecraft weight. During the design verification, various design and manufac- 
turing problems were encountered that could be attributed to the actions taken to reduce 
the weight. Several of the problems encountered and the corrective actions taken are 
discussed. 
The design certification of the structural  subsystem of the LM depended primarily 
on the results of the ground test program, which consisted of both component- and 
vehicle-level tests. Formal analyses were made to supplement the test program. 
These analyses served as a baseline and were supplemented by a delta analysis for 
each mission. 
GENERAL SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Design Requi rements 
The functional design requirements for  the LM structural  subsystem, which were 
specified to the contractor in the contract technical specifications, a r e  as follows. 
1. Ascent- stage structural subsystem 
a. A pressurized cabin with an allowable leakage rate  not to exceed 0.2 pound 
of oxygen per  hour at 5.0 psia in a vacuum 
b. The visibility necessary to enable the crew to perform the basic descent, 
landing, ascent, rendezvous, and docking maneuvers 
c. Two hatches for  crew transfer to and from the command module (CM) 
(1) Docking or  upper hatch for  normal crew transfer  to and from the CM 
(2) Front hatch of the LM for egress  to and ingress  f rom the lunar surface 
(3) Both hatches operable from the interior and exterior of the LM 
d. A docking interface and structure compatible with the requirements 
e. Provisions for  a structural connection to the descent stage capable of 
clear separation for  lunar launch o r  abort 
f .  Structural support f o r  the life support, environmental control, guidance 
and navigation, propulsion and stabilization, communications, and electrical power 
subsystems 
2. Descent-stage structural  subsystem 
a. Support for the LM in the spacecraft/LM adapter (SLA) 
b. Structural attachment of the LM landing gear  
c. Structural connection to the ascent stage 
d. Structural support for the environmental control, guidance and navigation, 
propulsion, and electrical power subsystems 
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e. Structural support for experiments and equipment for lunar activities 
f .  A platform for the lunar-launch ascent o r  for an abort 
Conf igu ra t ion  Descr ipt ion 
The launch configuration of the Saturn V and the overall LM vehicle configuration 
are shown in figures 1 and 2, respectively, and the basic vehicle dimensions are shown 
in figure 3. Both ascent and descent stages a r e  enclosed in thermal and micrometeo- 
roid shields. A detailed description of the ascent-stage and descent-stage structures 
is contained in appendix A. Details of the verification and certification of the LM are 
contained in appendix B. 
The ascent-stage structure is divided into three structural areas: crew compart- 
ment or cabin, midsection, and aft equipment bay (fig. 4). Aluminum alloys a r e  used pri- 
marily in the construction of the ascent stage. The major alloys are 2219 and 7075-T6. 
The cabin and midsection structural shell is cylindrical and of semimonocoque 
construction. The shell is a welded and mechanically fastened assembly of aluminum 
alloy sheets and machined longerons. The shell is supported by formed sheet-metal 
L u n a r  module - 
L u n a r  module 
4 
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+ L a u n c h  escape system 
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window, r VHF ~ D o c k l n g  antenna S band steerable docking antenna 7
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L t a d d e r  
Figure 1. - Saturn V launch vehicle and 
payload configuration. 
Figure 2. - Overall LM vehicle 
configuration. 
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Figure 4. - Lunar module ascent-stage 
structure. 
rings that are riveted to the structural  skin. 
A front-face assembly, attached mechani- 
cally to the cabin, encloses the forward end 
of the cabin. The front-face assembly in- 
corporates openings in the structure for  two 
triangular windows and the egress/ingress 
Figure 3. - Basic LM dimensions. 
hatch. The midsection is attached mechanically to the cabin by a bulkhead. The mid- 
section structure contains an opening for  the docking (top) hatch. The aft end of the 
midsection is closed by a bulkhead. The aft equipment bay is formed by a rack cantile- 
vered off the aft bulkhead by tubular struts.  The main propellant tanks are nonintegral 
and a r e  supported from the midsection by tubular s t ruts .  Various other tanks, such as 
the oxygen and helium tanks, are supported from the aft bulkhead o r  aft equipment rack 
in  the aft equipment bay. 
The descent-stage structure is constructed primarily of chemically milled webs, 
extruded and milled stiffeners, and milled cap s t r ips  (fig. 5). The material used in the 
construction of the descent stage is primarily 7075-T6 aluminum alloy. Titanium is 
used where high temperatures a r e  experienced. The main structure consists of two 
pa i rs  of parallel beams arranged in a cruciform configuration with structural  upper and 
lower decks and end bulkheads. A four-legged t r u s s  assembly (outrigger) is attached 
at the end of each pair  of beams. These assemblies se rve  as support for the LM in the 
SLA and as attachment points for  the main s t ru t s  of the landing gear  (fig. 5). 
The five compartments formed by the descent-stage main-beam assemblies house 
the major components of the propulsion system. The center compartment houses the 
descent engine, and the four outboard compartments support the nonintegral tanks. The 
four open quadrant a r e a s  of the descent stage are used to support various subsystems 
equipment and tanks. 
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Figure 5. - Lunar module descent-stage 
structure. 
Design Ver i f i ca t ion  
The LM structural design was veri- 
fied as a result of component- and vehicle- 
level tes ts  in combination with formal loads 
and structural analyses. Initially, the cer- 
tification program consisted primarily of 
the testing of the LM test art icle 3 (LTA-3), 
which was the structural test  vehicle. Test- 
ing at the component level was  conducted 
when it was impractical to impose the re- 
quired environment at the vehicle level and 
only when the correct  boundary conditions 
could be simulated adequately at the com- 
ponent level. 
The certification of the LM structural 
subsystem is defined by a network of certi- 
fication test requirements. Each certifica- 
tion test requirement (CTR) states the 
environmental conditions to be imposed 
during the test, the test-article configura- 
tion, and the success cr i ter ia  for the test. 
A CTR was  written for each test that was 
required to verify that the design require- 
ments were met. 
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AREAS 
Descent-Stage S hear-Panel  Fatigue and Thickness Contro l  
The descent- stage primary structure is constructed mainly of shear panels that 
are designed as diagonal-tension field beams. This type of beam develops the required 
strength after the shear web has developed buckles. The shear panels are chemically 
milled to provide a minimum-weight structure. The minimum thickness of these panels 
is 0.006 inch with a chemically milled tolerance of f 0. 002 inch. During the simulated 
launch and boost vibration tests, fatigue cracks were noticed at the transition zone be- 
tween the basic shear web and the rivet land. Typical shear-panel crack locations are 
shown in figure 6. The diagonal-tension buckle in the shear web terminates at the rivet 
land with a small  radius of curvature that results in a relatively high stress region. 
The buckle pattern and depth do not change significantly with increasing shear when the 
web has gone into diagonal tension. An analysis of the test data indicated that the buck- 
les oscillated in  the plane of the web. The high stress level was  satisfactory from a 
static viewpoint; however, the low-f requency-vibration environment caused high- s t r e s s  
low-cycle fatigue of the webs. A s  an interim fix on the early vehicles, a fiber-glass 
"picture frame" was  applied to each panel of the shear deck (three panels per beam) 
(fig. 7). The layers  of fiber-glass cloth were applied in decreasing widths in a pyram- 
idal form to provide a gradual increase in bending stiffness that terminated the buckle 
Descent-stage top deck Descent-stage top deck 
B 
W 
I\ J 
A - A  
I I  I 
Shear  web 
IT r F i b e r - g l a s s  
Figure 7. - Top-deck interim f ix .  
over a longer distance, thereby increasing 
the radius of curvature. Because the fiber- 
glass  fix was relatively heavy, a redesign 
of all the shear panels i n  the descent stage 
was accomplished to reduce the weight pen- 
alty. In the redesign, the minimum web 
thickness was increased to at least  
Detail A Detai l  B 
Figure 6. - Typical shear panel showing 
crack locations. 
0.020 inch on the top decks and 0.015 inch on the beam panels and end bulkheads. The 
effect of the increased thickness was to decrease stress to an acceptable level. The 
adequacy of the redesign was verified by a vehicle-level test for the launch and boost 
vibration environments. In a subsequent weight-reduction program, the minimum 
shear-web thickness for  the top decks and beam panels was reduced to 0.015 and 
0.012 inch, respectively. This configuration was verified by component panel tests by 
applying the internal loads determined during the vehicle-level vibration test. 
During the time a solution for  the fatigue problem was being developed, another 
problem regarding chemically milled par t s  was discovered. The thicknesses of the 
chemically milled webs were not to drawing tolerance, and, i n  some cases,  the webs 
were found to contain small  holes. The control of the thickness of the original sheet of 
aluminum was inadequate, and, when the sheet was chemically milled, the sheet- 
thickness variance was duplicated by the chemical milling. When final thicknesses are 
approximately 0.006 inch, the variance of the sheet-material thickness is extremely 
important. To correct this problem, a more rigorous process  of selecting the sheet 
material w a s  imposed, and a detailed thickness map was generated for  each par t  after 
manufacture. 
Stress Corrosion 
The first failure attributed to Stress-corrosion cracking on the LM structure  oc- 
curred in October 1966. A fitting on the aft equipment rack failed because of a lack of 
proper shimming. In November 1967, the LTA- 3 aft-equipment-rack support s t ru ts  
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were being load calibrated in preparation for static structural and drop tests. During 
the calibration, cracks were discovered on the ends of the swaged tubes where the end 
fittings were mechanically attached. An extensive investigation of all struts revealed 
23 cracked s t ruts  in the 264 par ts  inspected. The failures were attributed to s t r e s s  
corrosion caused by clamp-up stresses induced when the end fittings were attached. 
The corrective action taken was to modify all struts (64 on the ascent stage and descent 
stage) for  LM-3 and subsequent vehicles. The struts on LM-3 and LM-4 (Apollo mis- 
sions 9 and 10) were either changed to 7075-T73 if  sufficient structural capability ex- 
isted o r  modified to provide the required strength, even if stress-corrosion cracking 
occurred. On each subsequent LM, all s t ruts  except the outriggers were redesigned 
to the 7075-T73 condition. Corrective action on the outriggers consisted of shot peen- 
ing, liquid shimming, and painting the strut  ends. An additional precaution taken on all 
struts was the use of liquid shim at the attachment of the tube to the end fitting to pre- 
vent clamp-up stresses. 
The large number of stress-corrosion-induced failures precipitated a review of 
the entire structure for stress-corrosion-susceptible parts. This review, initiated at 
the request of the NASA, was conducted in January 1968 with support from the NASA 
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, the Ai r  
Force, and the Navy. The results of the review included an identification of all stress- 
corrosion-susceptible fittings and initiated a n  inspection of the fittings judged to be sus- 
ceptible. Additional corrective actions included changing the heat treatment from 
7075-T6 to 7075-T73, providing the required shims, and adding a protective paint to all 
susceptible fittings on all unassembled vehicles. During the inspections that were con- 
ducted as a result of the review, many stress-corrosion cracks were found. The 
inspections indicated that the problem w a s  chronic throughout the structure. In Decem- 
ber  1968, an additional review was conducted to determine which stress-corrosion- 
sensitive fittings were structurally critical. A structurally critical part  was defined 
as a part  that, if  cracked in  the predicted location, would not meet the required factor 
of safety. Approximately 40 critical fittings were identified using the data generated 
during the initial review. The number of fittings varied from vehicle to vehicle, de- 
pending on the configuration. The corrective action on the critical fittings consisted of 
reheattreating to the 7075-T73 condition, redesign using 7075-T73 material, o r  modi- 
fication of the existing fitting to provide the required load path, assuming the original 
fitting was cracked. In addition, liquid shimming applied to the mating surface of all 
structural members was  used to guarantee a perfect match between the parts and to 
prevent any potential stress-corrosion cracking from clamp-up stresses. 
Measures for the prevention of stress corrosion should be included in the design 
cr i ter ia  for all spacecraft structures. Stress-corrosion-susceptible alloys (low- 
threshold alloys such as 7075-T6) should be avoided, whenever practical, to prevent 
stress-corrosion cracking; and adequate shims, such as liquid shims, should be used. 
I nternally Machined Struts 
During the static structural test conducted to verify structural adequacy of the 
LM-10 and subsequent descent stages, failure of a lower outrigger strut  occurred. 
The cause of failure was attributed to an erroneously machined groove on the internal 
diameter that was  not discovered by inspection. The 16 outrigger s t ruts  (four per 
beam) provide the support for the LM in the SLA and for the primary landing-gear 
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struts. The lower outrigger s t ru ts  are straight tubular members approximately 
53 inches in length, 3.5 inches in  diameter, and 0.039 inch i n  wall thickness and have 
a closed, integral end fitting. The strut, which is machined from bar  stock, must be 
blind machined the entire length with a varying internal diameter along the length of the 
strut. The groove that caused the failure was located at the transition from the tube to 
the end fitting. The type of inspection previously performed was primarily a spot check 
of the wall thickness. This type of inspection detected only overall discrepancies, not 
local defects such as grooves. To ensure proper inspection of all s t ruts  having a ma- 
chined internal diameter greater  than 2 inches in depth, an inspection technique was 
developed that used a combination of radiograph and ultrasonic measurements. The 
radiograph was used primarily to detect localized discontinuities, and the ultrasonic 
measurements taken on a fine grid were used to determine the wall thickness. The in- 
spections made of assembled vehicles and on-the-shelf i tems resulted in  the identifica- 
tion of approximately 25 structural  par ts  with manufacturing defects, grooves, and 
undersized wall thicknesses. All the defective par t s  that resulted in a factor of safety 
below the acceptable value were either replaced with satisfactory par t s  of the same de- 
sign o r  a modified design. The outrigger s t ru ts  on LM-10 and subsequent vehicles 
were replaced with s t ruts  with nonintegral end fittings. To preclude the occurrence of 
a similar anomaly in  a highly weight-critical design, particular ca re  should be taken to 
avoid difficult machining operations. If these operations cannot be avoided, close coor- 
dination among engineering, manufacturing, and quality control personnel must be es- 
tablished to ensure adequacy of the finished product. 
Par ts  In t e r c h  angeabi I i ty 
During the inspection of the internally machined struts,  par t s  that were s imilar  
in  appearance but structurally different were found to be interchanged on the vehicle. 
In the L M  program, considerable emphasis was placed on weight reduction or  on keep- 
ing weight to a minimum. The emphasis on weight reduction resulted in  a design in 
which many par t s  were identical except for  a few thousandths inch difference in thick- 
ness. A detailed review of the entire structure w a s  conducted to determine the par ts  
that were interchangeable. Approximately 2700 par t s  that could be interchanged were 
identified. These par ts  then were reviewed structurally, assuming that the par t s  were 
interchanged, to determine if the required factor of safety was maintained. A s  a re- 
sult of this review, approximately 260 par t s  were identified that, if  interchanged, 
would not meet the required factor of safety. These par t s  were then inspected on all 
vehicles to verify that the correct  par t  was installed. The type of structural  par t s  that 
were interchangeable included i tems such as rod ends, shear  clips, cap strips,  cap- 
s t r ip  splices, and shear-panel stiffeners. A typical example of the thickness variations 
in similar par t s  is shown in figure 8. 
The problem of interchangeable par t s  can be solved by two methods. One method 
is to key all similar par ts  to make them noninterchangeable. The other method is to 
improve the quality control and inspection to  ensure manufacture and assembly in  ac- 
cordance with the engineering drawings. The first method will cost weight but is a 
more reliable way of avoiding incorrect installation of parts;  the latter method is 
lighter but is l e s s  reliable. 
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Figure 8. - Interchangeable par ts  on 
typical beam panel. 
Lunar-Landing Design Loads 
The structural design loads for the 
lunar-landing condition were based on the 
consideration of load capability of an indi- 
vidual landing gear, reasonable combina- 
tions of individual gear loads, lunar terrain, 
and the available energy that can be used to 
stroke the gears to the design position. 
Each of the four separate landing-gear leg 
assemblies has energy-absorption capabil- 
i ty  in  the single primary and two secondary 
struts. The primary s t rut  on each gear leg 
assembly consists of a lower inner cylinder 
that fits into an upper outer cylinder. A 
honeycomb cartridge that fits in  the two 
cylinders provides 9500 pounds of com- 
pression stroking at touchdown. The strut  
is attached at the upper end bv a universal 
fitting to the descent-stage outrigger assembly. A footpad is attached to ihe lower end 
of the inner cylinder by a ball-joint fitting. The secondary struts, two on each landing- 
gear assembly, also have an inner and an outer cylinder. The secondary s t ruts  have a 
5000-pound- compression and a 4500-pound- tension stroking capability. The landing- 
gear design is such that the kinematic position of the footpad can be described by a 
three-dimensional envelope. Assuming stroking is in the envelope, a unique set of 
orthogonal loads @, Y, Z)  is required at the landing-gear footpad for equilibrium with 
the stroking honeycomb cartridges. Structural design loads were chosen from a loads 
study that considered approximately 30 000 combinations of footpad positions and strut  
load levels per  gear assembly. The stroke-out (100 percent stroking) of the gear 
honeycomb cartridge was not considered in the loads study. From these loading con- 
ditions, 48 cases  were judged to provide the most severe structural loading. Using 
the se t s  of footpad forces, the vehicle was inertially balanced as a rigid body for each 
of the 48 load conditions. 
To account fo r  the dynamic response of an elastic vehicle to an actual landing, a 
dynamic magnification factor of 1.6 was applied to the rigid-body loads. The dynamic 
magnification factor was based on experience with aircraft  structures and a judgment 
of the nature of the dynamic response of the LM structure. An analysis, using an elas- 
t ic model of the LM, was conducted for a few landing conditions, and the elastic struc- 
tural  response of significant mass  i tems was compared to the rigid-body response. In 
the cases  examined, the load magnification factor did not exceed 1.6. 
At this time in the program, weight was an extremely critical issue. In an at- 
tempt to reduce structural weight, a variable factor of safety for the 48 cases  was  
generated. Factors of safety of 1.35, 1.15, and 1 .0  (rather than the specification re- 
quirement of 1.5) were used with the foregoing static-equivalent limit landing loads. 
A factor of safety of 1.35 was used with the kinematic load sets judged to have the 
highest possibility of occurrence; a factor of safety of 1 . 0  was  used with the kinematic 
load sets judged to have very little possibility of occurrence. The use of a maximum 
factor of safety of 1. 35 was  acceptable based on the rationale that the landing gear acts  
as a load-limiting device with respect to the structure. Judgment of the probability of 
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occurrence of each of the design load cases  was made for  each kinematic case on the 
basis of how many gear legs were loaded and the type of load pattern. Fo r  example, 
cases requiring only one gear leg to be under load (in contact with the surface) are 
likely and, therefore, are assigned a factor of safety of 1. 35; however, cases in which 
all four gear legs are loaded simultaneously and in a complicated manner are extremely 
unlikely to occur and are assigned a factor of safety of 1.0. The design loads were be- 
lieved to be conservative; however, because judgment of both contractor and MSC per- 
sonnel was involved, additional confidence was desired. A detailed Monte Carlo 
statistical analysis of LM structural response during the lunar-landing phase was con- 
ducted by MSC. The study used statistical definitions of lunar-surface conditions ob- 
tained from Ranger 8 data and vehicle attitude and velocities obtained from contractor 
and MSC lunar-landing simulation studies in conjunction with a detailed elastic model 
of the LM structure and gear. Maximum member loads at critical points throughout 
the structure were determined fo r  approximately 300 landings. The results of the sta- 
tistical analysis indicated that the factor of safety of the LM structure was in excess of 
1.5 when compared to the resulting 3-sigma loads. 
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M I S S I ON PE RFO RMANCE 
The LM structure has been flown on 1 0  Apollo missions. These missions include 
the developmental missions that used LTA-2R and LTA-1OR and the missions that used 
LM-1, LM-3, LM-4, LM-5, LM-6, LM-7, LM-8, and LM-10. During these missions, 
no problems associated with the primary LM structure occurred. Structural anomalies 
encountered during the missions were associated with the secondary structure. These 
anomalies and descriptions of the corrective actions are listed in table I. The LTA-BR, 
LTA-lOR, LM-1, and LM-3 were instrumented to obtain data during launch and space 
flight. The data obtained were used to verify the adequacy of the design environment. 
'ehicle -
LM-1 
LM-1 
LM-3 
LM-3 
LM-3 
LM-3 
LM-4 
LM-4 
LM-5 
LM-6 
LM -6 
Anomaly 
Change in cabin- 
p r e s s u r e  leak 
rate 
Fai lure  of descent -  
s tage  fiber - g l a s s  
t h e r m a l  shield 
Forward  hatch binding 
Descent  - s tage propel- 
lant  tank s t r u c t u r a l  
contact  
Docking windows 
depos i t s  
Loose w a s h e r  between 
docking window 
p a n e s  
LM cabin p r e s s u r e  
dropped abruptly 
at command and 
s e r v i c e  module 
separa t ion  
3.5"  misal inement  
while docked 
Cabin decompress ion  
requi red  longer  
than predicted 
MESAa D-ring handle 
would not release 
f r o m  support  
b r a c k e t  
Tear in t h e r m a l  shield 
on forward  hatch 
TABLE I. - FLIGHT ANOMALIES 
Cause 
Unknown 
Blanket not fastened 
adequately 
In te r fe rence  with micrometeor i te  
sLield and t h e r m a l  blankets; 
snubber  failed to accommodate  
f loor/hatch spacing 
Tank contacted upper deck  dur ing  
S-IC engine cut-off 
Contamination f rom CM waste  
water  and ur ine  
Lack of inspection 
P r e s s u r e  on hatch latch (pyro- 
technic f i r ing  and tunnel 
p r e s s u r e )  exceeded la tch  
capability; sudden LM decom-  
press ion  followed hatch 
opening 
Command and serv ice  module r o l l  
j e t s  not disabled a f t e r  soft 
docking 
Cabin p r e s s u r e  t ransducer  r e a d -  
ing high on low scale  
Poss ib le  faulty re tent ion pin or  
bal l ;  i m p r o p e r  pull angle 
applied to handle f o r  deploy- 
ment by astronaut  
Damaged dur ing  astronaut  
e g r e s s / i n g r e s s  by portable  
life support  sys tem 
Action 
None. Minimum cabin p r e s s u r e  
w a s  maintained dur ing  mission 
Drawing change a s s u r e d  blanket 
fas tened s e c u r e l y  on LM-3 
Shield extended and blanket taped 
f o r  LM-5; snubber  a l s o  
red  e s igned 
Deck opening enlarged and 
doubler  added for LM-5 
No action requi red  on LM 
Improved  
inspect ion 
Undocking p r o c e d u r e s  changed 
to  e n s u r e  low tunnel p r e s s u r e  
a t  LM jet t ison 
Roll  j e t s  inhibited dur ing  soft 
dock - vehicles  c a n  to le ra te  
requi red  6 "  misa l inement  
T i m e  l imi t  es tabl ished in  Apollo 
Opera t ions  Handbook for hatch 
opening. Removed b a c t e r i a  
filter 
Red e s igned handle re lease 
mechanism 
Redesigned t h e r m a l  shield 
a Modular  equipment  stowage assembly .  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The structure of the lunar module has been designed and manufactured to reduce 
weight to a minimum. The design certification depended primarily on the ground test 
program. Formal analyses were made to supplement the test program and to serve  as 
a baseline for each mission. Testing at the component level was conducted when it was 
impractical to impose the required environment at the vehicle level. 
Significant problem areas encountered were shear-panel fatigue, thickness con- 
t rol  of panels, stress-corrosion cracking, machined-strut tolerances, and interchange- 
able par t s  similar in  appearance but structurally different. 
The structural adequacy of the lunar module to meet the design environment con- 
ditions has been verified on 1 0  Apollo missions. No problems associated with the pri- 
mary lunar module occurred. The structural anomalies encountered during the mission 
were associated with the secondary structure and corrective action was taken. 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, October 2, 1972 
91 4- 1 3- 20-1 3- 72 
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APPENDIX A 
CONFIGURATION DESCRIPTION 
The overall LM configuration is shown in figure 2, and the basic vehicle dimen- 
sions a r e  shown in figure 3. Aluminum alloys are the primary construction material. 
Some brackets and fasteners a r e  made of titanium. Both the ascent stage and the de- 
scent stage a r e  enclosed in thermal and micrometeoroid shields. 
ASCENT STAGE 
The ascent-stage structure is divided into three structural areas:  cabin, mid- 
section, and aft equipment bay (fig. 4). 
The cylindrical structural shell of the cabin is 92 inches in diameter and of semi- 
monocoque construction. The shell, which is welded and mechanically fastened together, 
is made of aluminum-alloy sheet metal and machined longerons, 
A front-face assembly is attached mechanically to the cylindrical shell, and the 
construction methods are the same a s  for the shell. The front-face assembly incorpo- 
rates openings in the structure for two triangular windows and for the egress/ingress 
hatch. Two large structural beams, which extend up the forward side of the front-face 
assembly, a r e  used to carry and to support the structural loads applied to the cabin 
structure. The lower ends of the beams form and support the two forward interstage 
fittings; the upper ends of the beams a r e  secured to additional beam structures extending 
across  the top of the cylindrical cabin aft to the midsection structure. 
The forward RCS engine clusters a r e  mounted on aluminum -alloy tubular t russ  
members mechanically attached to both sides of the front-face assembly. A t russ  mem- 
ber extends aft and is secured to a longeron located at the maximum width of the cabin. 
The midsection structure consists of a ring-stiffened semimonocoque shell of con- 
struction similar to that of the cabin. The midsection is formed by two segments of a 
cylinder and upper and lower decks. The shell is a chemically milled aluminum skin 
with machined stiffeners and longerons mechanically attached o r  welded to it. 
cylindrical segments have a radius of 92.0 inches. The upper and lower decks are inte- 
grally stiffened machined decks of aluminum alloy that close the midsection. The mid- 
section assembly shell is fastened mechanically to flanges on the two major structural 
bulkheads. 
alloy plate. The cabin shell is attached mechanically to an outboard flange of the for  - 
ward bulkhead, which completes the pressurized portion of the ascent stage. 
The 
The bulkheads are integrally stiffened machine assemblies of aluminum - 
The lower deck of the midsection provides the structural support for the ascent 
engine. The upper deck provides the structural support for the docking tunnel and hatch. 
The lower end of the 32-inch-diameter tunnel is welded to the deck structure, and the 
upper end of the 16-inch-long tunnel is secured to an outer deck. The two main beams 
running fore and aft, which a r e  integrated with those above the cabin, are secured to 
the upper deck and support the outboard edge of the outer deck. The aft ends of the 
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beams a r e  fastened to the aft bulkhead. 
tubular t russ  members for  both aft interstage fittings. The combination of front-face 
beams, cabin and midsection beams, aft bulkhead, and interstage structure forms a 
cradle to support the ascent-stage loads. The ascent-engine propellant storage tanks 
a r e  supported on tubular t ru s s  members attached to the forward and aft bulkheads. The 
RCS propellant-tank-support assemblies are supported externally to both s ides  of the 
midsection, Two canted beam assemblies a r e  secured to the bottom of the midsection 
lower deck and to both fore and aft bulkheads, forming the ascent-engine compartment. 
The aft bulkhead has provisions for  bolting the 
I The engine-support ring is bolted to the lugs on the lower deck. 
The aft equipment bay, located aft of the midsection pressure-tight bulkhead, is 
The supporting structure of the bay consists of tubular t ru s s  an  unpressurized area. 
members bolted to the aft side of the aft bulkhead. The t russ  members extend from the 
bulkhead aft to the equipment rack. The equipment-rack assembly is constructed of a 
series of vertical box beams supported by upper and lower frames. The beams have 
integral cold plates that serve as a heat-transfer link to the electronic equipment 
mounted on the beam racks. 
Two gaseous oxygen tanks and two helium tanks are secured to t ru s s  members 
and brackets in the area between the aft bulkhead and the equipment rack. Various 
support mountings and brackets secured to the aft side of the aft bulkhead serve  as sup- 
ports and mounts for valves, plumbing lines, and wiring, and for environmental control 
system and propulsion subsystems components that do not require a pressurized envi- 
ronment. 
the upper and lower corners  of the equipment-rack assembly and to the aft bulkhead. 
The two aft RCS thruster clusters are supported by t russ  members bolted to 
The ascent stage is configured with three windows as shown in figure 2. Two 
triangular windows in the front-face bulkhead of the forward cabin section provide the 
required visibility during the descent - 
transfer -orbit, lunar -landing, lunar -stay, 
and rendezvous phases of the mission. 
Both windows have approximately 2 square 
feet of viewing area and are canted down 
and to the side to permit adequate periph- 
e ra l  and downward visibility. Each window 
consists of two panes separated from each 
other by a cavity that is vented to the space 
environment (fig. A-1). The outer non- 
structural  pane is a micrometeoroid/ 
radiation protective window made from 
annealed (Vycor) glass. The inner pane is 
the structural window made from tempered 
(Chemcor) glass. 
clamped on; the inner window is a "floating" 
window on a seal  constructed from metallic 
spring surrounded by a Teflon jacket. Both 
windows on the commander's side (left- 
hand side) have a landing point designator 
painted on them that provides the astronaut 
with the capability to target the desired 
final landing point. 
The outer window is 
Protective cover  ' 
(polycarbonale l  r S p r i n g  loaded e lect r ica l  contact  - C u s h i o n  
Gold plated b u s  b a r  
Protective coverJ t I V y c o r  79131 
(polycarbonate) *'Removed p r i o r  to l a u n c h  
Figure A-1. - Cross  section of a forward 
window. 
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Gold plated b u s  bar 
An overhead docking window on the 
left side of the vehicle, directly over the 
commander's head, provides the required 
visibility during the final phase of the dock- 
ing maneuver. The docking window has 
approximately 60 square inches (5 by 
12 inches) of viewing area. 
tion of this rectangular window (fig. A-2) 
is similar to that of the two forward win- 
dows. One exception is that the inner 
structural window is not a floating window; 
it is attached rigidly to the cabin skin by a 
Kovar edge member bonded to the Chemcor 
glass and bolted to the cabin structure. 
curved to match the 92-inch diameter of the 
cabin skin and is not flat like the forward 
windows. docking window. 
Kovar edge member 
The construc- 
F,ber g,as 
re ta iners P ressu re  vessel 
Outboard Another exception is that the window is + Removed p r i o r  l o  l a u n c h  
Figure A-2. - Cross section of the upper 
All three inner windows have an electrical conductive coating that is used to heat 
The electrical connection, which provides the required power of 115 volts ac 
the window and to remove any moisture (fog or  ice) that may accumulate during the 
mission, 
for the forward windows and 28 volts dc for the docking window, is a spring-loaded 
contact against the bus bars  that are integral to the glass. The original design required 
that the electrical wire be soldered directly to the bus bar. 
The ascent-stage structure has two hatches (upper and forward) that permit 
The upper egress/ingress to the LM from both the CM and lunar surface (fig. 2). 
(docking) hatch is located in the midsection on the +X axis, directly above the ascent- 
engine cover, and is supported by the upper deck. The hatch is approximately 32 inches 
in diameter. 
mately 32 by 32 inches. Each hatch has hinges on one side and a manually operated 
single-detent mechanism on the other side that preloads the hatch against the seal. A 
cabin-pressure-dump-relief valve is located in each hatch. Each hatch is sealed with 
a preloaded silicon elastomeric-compound seal mounted in the LM structure, When the 
hatch is closed, a lip near the outer edge of the hatch presses  against the seal to ensure 
a pressure-tight contact. 
surization forces the hatches against the seals. To open either hatch, it is necessary 
to depressurize the cabin through the dump valve. 
The forward hatch, located in the forward bulkhead, is a square approxi- 
Because both hatches open into the LM, normal cabin pres-  
DESCENT STAGE 
The descent-stage structure is constructed of aluminum alloy, chemically milled 
webs, extruded and milled stiffeners, and milled cap s t r ips  (fig. 5). All joints a r e  
fastened with standard mechanical fasteners. The main structure consists of two pairs  
of parallel beams arranged in a cruciform configuration, with upper and lower decks. 
The ends of the beams are closed by end-closure bulkheads. A four-legged t russ  assem- 
bly (outrigger) is attached at the end of each pair of beams. These outriggers serve as 
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support for the LM in the SLA and as the attachment points for the main struts of the 
landing gear. The t russ  members are constructed of aluminum -alloy tubing. 
The five compartments formed by the descent-stage main-beam assemblies house 
the major components of the descent propulsion system. The center compartment 
houses the descent engine supported by eight tubular t russ  members secured to the four 
corners of the compartment and to the engine gimbal ring. The two compartments 
formed on the Z-axis  house the oxidizer tanks, and the two compartments formed on 
the Y-axis house the fuel tanks. The propellant tanks a r e  supported by cylindrical 
honeycomb skir ts  attached to the lower decks. 
The quadrant a reas  between the main beams of the descent stage a r e  enclosed, 
thus giving the stage its octagon shape. These areas use a minimal amount of structure 
because all components housed in these a reas  are secured to the main-beam structure. 
All mounts and brackets that support the components within the quadrant areas a r e  con- 
structed of aluminum-alloy brackets and tubular t russ  members. The quadrant I1 area, 
which supports the scientific equipment and landing radar, is the only area where addi- 
tional structural support exists. These supports are secured to the main structural- 
support members. 
The descent stage base heat shield (BHS) is subjected to high temperatures of 
approximately 2400" F maximum caused by radiation from the engine and its plume. 
The BHS, which protects the descent-stage lower deck, descent propulsion system pro- 
pellant tanks, and the engine compartment, is a composite of alternate layers of nickel 
foil and Fiberfrax supported by standoffs attached to the titanium BHS structure. 
A specially shaped blast shield of Teflon-coated titanium is secured to the upper 
edge of the engine compartment, creating an upper deck that covers the entire descent- 
engine compartment. The shield is used to deflect the ascent-engine plume outward at 
ignition. The ascent engine is just above and on the same centerline as that of the 
descent engine. 
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APPENDIX B 
DES I GN VER I F I CAT I ON 
I The LTA-3 test program began in January 1966. The test philosophy was to im- 
pose the mission environment to the design ultimate conditions in the same sequence 
that would be experienced during an actual mission. 
, 
I The test program was initiated with a pressure test of the ascent-stage cabin. 
This test was conducted to  a pressure level of 9.9 psid, 85 percent of design ultimate 
(2.0 X 5.8 psid = 11.6). The reduction in the demonstrated factor of safety was neces- 
sa ry  to  reduce the potential of experiencing a premature failure on the only available 
test article. If failure had occurred, the required schedule at that time could not have 
been met. The demonstrated factor of safety during the test program was generally 
the design factor of safety. For launch load conditions, a reduced demonstrated factor 
of safety was permitted to  the level of the adjacent structure. For example, the SLA 
factor of safety of 1 .4  was permitted. After the successful pressure test, the vehicle 
was exposed to ascent-engine and descent-engine vibration tests, then shipped to  MSC 
for  the launch and boost low-frequency vibration and acoustic tests. These tests were 
accomplished with the vehicle supported in a n  SLA. The acoustic test was done with 
the entire spacecraft; that is, CM, service module, SLA, and LM stacked in the proper 
configuration. Structural adequacy was verified, and an accurate environment was de- 
fined for  all LM components and equipment. The data obtained during the two tes ts  
provided the qualification environment for  all components and verified the adequacy 
of the environment simulated in the qualification tests already completed. 
After the acoustic test, the LTA-3 vehicle was returned to the contractor for  
continuation of the structural-test program. T h e  static-load tests included conditions 
that represented the maximum product of dynamic pressure and angle of attack ( m a  qcr) 
and conditions at the end of Saturn V first-stage boost. The max qcr test was accom- 
plished successfully; however, during the end-boost test, failure of a top-deck shear 
web occurred at approximately 97 percent of l imi t  load. The failure was a result of 
fatigue damage accumulated during the previous vibration tests. The vehicle damage 
incurred during the failure was repaired and the static test continued. At approxi- 
mately 117 percent of limit load, an upper outrigger s t rut  failed as a resul t  of not 
having been manufactured according to the engineering requirements. The drawing 
had been misinterpreted by the shop personnel and inspector. The upper outrigger 
s t ru ts  were replaced with correct par ts ,  and the test was continued successfully to 
140 percent of limit load. 
The next series of vehicle-level tests consisted of static tests to  150 percent of 
limit load, representing the design conditions on the ascent-engine and descent-engine 
support structures.  Both these tests were completed successfully. The ascent-engine 
tes t  was repeated successfully when the engine was rotated 180" and canted 1 . 5 "  for- 
ward to  optimize the thrust vector relative to the vehicle center-of-gravity location. 
As a result ,  a significant redesign of the support structure was made. 
Drop tests were then conducted to verify structural adequacy for  lunar landing. 
The drop tests were different from the static structural tes ts  because the static tests 
were conducted primarily with the loads applied to the test article by load jacks, 
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whiffletrees, e t  cetera.  In the drop tests, the objective w a s  t o  duplicate the kinematic 
landing loads. A flight set of LM landing gears  was used to provide the loads to the 
vehicle. The gear  honeycomb cartridges were precrushed to obtain the landing-gear 
geometry that would produce the desired kinematic load. This set  of forces  would pro- 
vide the desired rigid-body accelerations. The tes ts  were conducted by dropping the 
LTA-3 from a level position. The landing-gear footpads (nonflight) impacted platforms 
that were sloped to the required attitude to provide the kinematic load vector. The 
drop height varied from approximately 8.3 to 42 inches, which provided an impact ve- 
locity range of 6.7 to 15  ft/sec. The 15-ft/sec drop exceeded the design requirement 
for  velocity; however, the resulting loads did not exceed design loads. The excess  
velocity was chosen to provide a longer test  duration, which is dependent primarily 
upon the total energy available at impact. The drop-test program consisted of 16 drops. 
Six of these were reduced-level drops. The reduced-level drops were accomplished 
with a special test landing gear that used cartridges with crush characterist ics equal to 
75 percent of flight-hardware requirements. To demonstrate the capability of the 
other LM systems to sustain successfully the loads and shock associated with the lunar 
landing, a series of five drop tests was accomplished on LM-2. These tests were done 
with all systems operational. Tests  and evaluations of the systems both before and 
after the drop tests indicated that no degradation occurred as a result of the landing 
shock. The tes ts  were accomplished with the same test equipment used in the s t ruc-  
tural drop tests.  The drop-test se r ies  w a s  completed successfully without any test- 
related problems. 
The final se r ies  of vehicle-level tes t s  performed on LTA-3 was performed to 
verify the docking-interface structure.  To apply the loads adequately to  the LM, a CM 
structural test art icle was used that eliminated the necessity of simulating the boundary 
conditions provided by the CM. The tests were conducted by application of the design 
loads. After the first docked test ,  the newly determined mission loads exceeded the 
design capability as determined by analysis. Additional tests were conducted to deter-  
mine the actual strength of the design. During the second ser ies ,  tests were conducted 
to verify the adequacy by assuming various combinations of failed docking latches. This 
testing was in support of mission-rules definition. The failed-latch conditions were 
not original design requirements. 
The vehicle-level certification tests were supplemented by component-level tests.  
Typical areas  of the LM structure that were tested by component-level tests were win- 
dows, ascent-stage and descent-stage base heat shield, drogue support, hatches, and 
the modular equipment stowage assembly. 
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